10 minute read | March.18.2024
On February 28, 2024, President Biden issued Executive Order 14117, calling for new regulations to prohibit or restrict transactions that enable countries of concern to access sensitive U.S. personal and government data. The order seeks to address the mounting risk that countries of concern -- today, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela -- could use advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) to process large sets of sensitive personal data or data associated with the U.S. government. The danger is that these countries of concern could use insights from processing the data to engage in “espionage, influence, kinetic, or cyber operations” against the United States. Additionally, the order is intended to address the risk that countries of concern may use bulk sets of sensitive personal data to create and refine AI to improve their ability to exploit data.
The order directs the Department of Justice (DOJ) to draft regulations prohibiting or restricting transactions that enable countries of concern to access certain U.S. sensitive personal and government data. DOJ’s National Security Division has issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking outlining the contemplated regulations.
Comments on the notice are due by April 19, 2024. DOJ is expected to issue a proposed rule by August 26, 2024.
The notice proposes regulating data transactions between U.S. persons and covered persons, defined in the order to include entities subject to the jurisdiction, direction, ownership or control of countries of concern and their employees and contractors, as well as employees and contractors, and residents, of China (including Hong Kong and Macau), Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela.
This expansive definition includes both persons who fall within pre-defined categories, as well as persons DOJ would designate on a public list, modeled on OFAC sanctions lists.
The order directs the Attorney General to restrict transactions involving bulk sensitive personal data or U.S. government-related data. The order provides basic definitions for these terms, which are further defined in the notice.
The order outlines six categories of sensitive personal data, which the notice further defines:
The notice proposes different thresholds to determine when a collection of sensitive personal data constitutes bulk data based on its category.
The order defines U.S. government-related data as sensitive personal data that poses a heightened risk of being exploited by a country of concern to harm United States national security regardless of volume and that:
The notice proposes categorizing U.S. government-related data into two categories:
The notice proposes a two-tiered regulatory regime consisting of “prohibited transactions” (certain classes of “highly sensitive” transactions prohibited in their entirety) and “restricted transactions” (transactions that would be permitted only if they comply with security requirements to be developed by CISA).
The notice would categorically prohibit covered data transactions that raise the highest national security risks. These transactions would enable countries of concern or covered persons to access bulk U.S. sensitive personal data or government-related data. The notice identifies two categories of covered data transactions that warrant prohibition:
The notice would restrict certain covered data transactions by prohibiting them except to the extent that they comply with predefined security requirements. These transactions may enable countries of concern or covered persons to access bulk U.S. sensitive personal data or government-related data unless certain security requirements are implemented. CISA will establish these security requirements in a separate rulemaking. The notice identifies three categories of covered data transactions for restriction:
The notice contemplates exempting data transactions involving personal communications and information or informational materials and certain transactions for U.S. government activities.
The notice outlines a civil enforcement regime with processes similar to those followed by OFAC and CFIUS. It would have mechanisms for a pre-penalty notice, an opportunity to respond and a final decision.
However, unlike OFAC regulations, which are applied on a strict liability basis, the notice states that the rules to be issued are “not intended to operate as a strict-liability standard.” Rather, DOJ would prohibit U.S persons “knowingly” engaging “in a covered data transaction with a country of concern or covered person” and knowingly directing transactions that would be prohibited if a U.S. person engaged in them. In addition to civil enforcement, the DOJ fact sheet published alongside the order and notice notes that the order also authorizes DOJ to pursue criminal remedies for violations of the new regulations.
DOJ does not propose general compliance requirements and instead contemplates a risk-based compliance model similar to economic sanctions programs that OFAC administers. U.S. persons would be expected to develop and implement risk-based compliance programs, with the expectation that programs will vary based on factors such as the U.S. person’s “size and sophistication, products and services, customers and counterparties, and geographic locations.” Similar to the enforcement regime for OFAC economic sanctions programs, DOJ would consider the adequacy of the compliance program in any enforcement action.
In addition, the notice contemplates a licensing regime to authorize covered data transactions that would otherwise be prohibited or restricted. This regime would be modeled on the licensing regime OFAC uses and would include both general and specific licenses.
As discussed above, the order directs CISA to develop a framework of security requirements that private parties must implement before engaging in restricted transactions. These security requirements may include “(1) organizational requirements (e.g., basic organizational cybersecurity posture), (2) transaction requirements (e.g., data minimization and masking, use of privacy-preserving technologies, requirements for information-technology systems to prevent unauthorized disclosure, and logical and physical access controls) and (3) compliance requirements (e.g., audits).” CISA will issue these security requirements through a separate notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
The order also directs the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (Team Telecom) to consider threats to bulk sensitive personal data in reviewing new applications and existing licenses related to submarine cable lines.
With regard to healthcare, the order requires several federal agencies to consider steps to prohibit assistance that enables countries of concern or covered persons to access United States persons’ bulk sensitive personal data, including personal health and human genomic data.
The order directs the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to consider addressing the risk posed by entities in the data brokerage industry who may enable access to bulk sensitive personal data and U.S. government-related data by countries of concern and covered persons.
The order is the first significant move by the U.S. government to restrict cross-border data transfer. The order and notice contemplate an expansive new regulatory regime to address national security risks posed by commercial transactions that potentially transfer sensitive personal or U.S. government data to countries of concern. The program is intended to reflect the U.S. government’s commitment to the free flow of information, but is still likely to impose significant compliance obligations.
The order instructs the Attorney General to publish a proposed rule by August 26, 2024. U.S. companies will likely need to develop and implement rigorous compliance programs based on their risk profiles. Companies should monitor the rulemaking process and forthcoming CISA security requirements.
As the regulations develop, we strongly recommend that companies transacting in covered data confirm compliance efforts with legal counsel.
Want to know more? Reach out to one of the authors or another member of the Orrick team.